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Abstract
Should we use the language of international criminal law (ICL) to discuss, analyze, and address Western
policies of migration control? Such policies have included or resulted in indefinite and inhumane deten-
tion, deportations, including through practices of push- and pull-backs and numerous deaths of migrants
attempting to cross land or sea borders. And yet, recourse to ICL’s conceptual and rhetorical apparatus,
often reserved for “unimaginable atrocities,” may seem ill-fitting and an emotive stretch of doctrine.
Drawing from international strategic litigation practice on Australian and European policies, this article
examines whether the legal concept of crimes against humanity can apply to the deaths, detention, and
deportation of migrants, as part and consequence of Western policies of migration control. As migration
control policies involve increasingly sophisticated practices of outsourcing and responsibility avoidance, I
further ask whether the tools ICL has developed to describe system criminality can trace individual liability
against the distance created by such policies. I also inquire into the potential that the transnational nature
of migration and the spreading of anti-migration policies have in activating the jurisdiction of courts and
the prioritization of the role of the International Criminal Court. Finally, I consider the danger of fetish-
izing an international punitive approach, before offering some thoughts that aim to bridge a critical
approach to international criminal law with its use in meaningful strategic litigation. Throughout the
Article, I argue that applying the categories of ICL to Western policies of migration control can contribute
to revealing both the potential and the limits of the regime and its institutions, as well as the structures of
asymmetry and injustice present both in anti-migration policies and in international criminal law itself.
Keywords: Migration control; international criminal law; crimes against humanity; Australia; migrant detention
A. Introduction
“This issue must be understood as the annihilation of human beings,” wrote Behrouz Boochani1
from the Manus Island detention camp, at the heart of the Australian regime of migration deten-
tion. “It has been nearly five years full of anguish, anguish that has ground everyone down.”2 His
book, No Friend but the Mountains, “smuggled out” from the camp via text messages, manages
*Lecturer in Law, City Law School, City, University of London; Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School; Co-founder, Global
Legal Action Network. I thank the editors of the Special Issue, Cathryn Costello and Itamar Mann, journal editor Nora
Markard, as well as Valentina Azarova and Naz K Modirzadeh. The Workshop on “Accountability for Human Rights
Violations in Migration Control” held in Oxford on Nov. 10, 2018, that led to the development of this Article was funded
by an ERC Starter Grant RefMig (Grant Agreement 716968, PI Cathryn Costello). All errors remain my own.
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the German Law Journal. This is an Open Access article,
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1Behrouz Boochani, “This is Hell Out Here”: How Behrouz Boochani’s Diaries Expose Australia’s Refugee Shame, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/this-is-hell-behrouz-boochani-diaries-expose-
australia-refugee-shame; see BEHROUZ BOOCHANI, NO FRIEND BUT THE MOUNTAINS: WRITING FROM MANUS PRISON (2019).
2Id. Entry of Nov. 2.
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both to convey and to transcend the misery of inhumane and indefinite detention. He has called
the Australian policy criminal, a “crime against humanity,” for which Australian politicians must
and will be held accountable,3 a crime that reflects “the deepest form of violence in the world.”4
Is this true, in law? What would it take for a policy of a developed state aiming to limit and deter
migration to its territory to carry such a heavy label? In 2015, in a co-authored article focusing on
Greece,5 I argued that the practice of immigration detention developed by European democracies,
with the cooperation of the European Union’s Frontex agency, may very well satisfy the legal def-
inition of a crime against humanity. Such crimes may not easily fit our established imagination of
what is an international crime and who is an international criminal. The law has been predomi-
nantly applied, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been predominantly focused, on
“spectacular” violence committed by tyrants and rebels, rather than the “banal” violence which
is a seemingly inevitable byproduct of global inequality. Two years later, I participated in the making
of a similar argument in the context of advocacy: the submission of a Communication to the Office
of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, on the situation in Australia, Manus Island and Nauru.6 We
used open source evidence, a recently leaked cache of 2,000 documents,7 as well as over 70 interviews
with individuals formerly held in the offshore detention centers and others with first-hand knowl-
edge of the facts.8 We found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Australia and its
corporate agents had committed acts of unlawful deportation, imprisonment, torture, persecution
and other inhumane acts, as part of “a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian popu-
lation,” therefore satisfying the definition of “crimes against humanity” under the Statute.9 When it
came to the gravity of the situation, which is a criterion of admissibility,10 the Communication high-
lighted the danger of normalizing these practices, with a risk of their further emulation:
[B]ecause [of the Australian policy’s] potential to set a precedent, and to normalise subjecting
vulnerable refugee populations to inhumane detention practices in order to deter future refugee
flows : : : [and] the extent that the policies Australia is adopting are taken up by other states, the
Australian situation will result in the normalisation of crimes against humanity [and] the
3See, among many, Behrouz Boochani’s comment that “Australia cannot ignore the human crisis in Manus and Nauru. The
situation is getting worse day by day, it is a crime against humanity and violation of human rights. I wonder why the
international humanitarian organization are silent in the face of these crimes” (May 26, 2019), https://twitter.com/
behrouzboochani/status/1132850690705854464.
4Holly Young, This is the Deepest Form of Violence in the World – An Interview with Behrouz Boochani, SPEX (Apr. 10,
2019), https://spex.de/behrouz-boochani-interview-this-is-the-deepest-form-of-violence-in-the-world/.
5Ioannis Kalpouzos & Itamar Mann, Banal Crimes Against Humanity: The Case of Asylum Seekers in Greece, 16
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1 (2015).
6This was submitted by seventeen academic experts in international criminal and refugee law, brought together by the
Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN). See
Communiqué to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Under Article 15 of the Rome Statute,
The Situation in Nauru and Manus Island: Liability for Crimes Against Humanity in the Detention of Refugees and
Asylum Seekers, https://c5e65ece-003b-4d73-aa76-854664da4e33.filesusr.com/ugd/b743d9_e4413cb72e1646d8bd3e8a8c9a466950.
pdf [hereinafter ICC Australia Communication]. For contemporary coverage see Jamie Smyth, Lawyers Urge ICC to Probe
Australia over Refugee Abuse Claims, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/cfc1cce8-f193-11e6-8758-
6876151821a6; Ben Doherty, International Criminal Court Told Australia’s Detention Regime Could Be a Crime Against
Humanity, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/feb/13/international-criminal-
court-told-australias-detention-regime-could-be-a-against-humanity; Rebecca Hamilton, Australia’s Refugee Policy is a Crime
against Humanity, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 23, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/23/australias-refugee-policy-may-be-
officially-a-crime-against-humanity/.
7See The Nauru Files, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ng-interactive/2016/aug/10/the-nauru-files-the-lives-
of-asylum-seekers-in-detention-detailed-in-a-unique-database-interactive.
8These were conducted and analyzed by the Stanford clinic’s students who also contributed to the drafting of the
Communication. See ICC Australia Communication, at 2.
9See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
10See id. art. 17(1)(d).
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perception that a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population may be seen as
normal, banal, and potentially acceptable. Australia is no pariah state. It is a relatively wealthy,
“Western,” democracy. Its actions and policies have an added effect in terms of being influential
and being replicated elsewhere, specifically in other states that are receiving refugee flows.11
The scholarly and advocacy work attempted to apply the lex lata to particular migration control
scenarios, also with a view to understanding what role international criminal law (ICL) can play in
framing and addressing it. The institutional response to the advocacy was mixed. The OTP
acknowledged receipt12 and confirmed it is analyzing the situation.13 The Australian Minister
of Immigration referred to the communication as a “wacky cause.”14 Since then, the understand-
ing of the Australian policy as crimes against humanity has spread, leading to other legal actions
using the label,15 alongside those employing the more moderate tools of human rights or tort
law.16 As this article is going to press, three years after our submission,17 the Office of the
Prosecutor responded. In a four-page document,18 the OTP found multiple prohibited acts of
unlawful imprisonment but did not consider these to constitute crimes against humanity.
Drawing from this practice and scholarly experience, the present article is a reflection on the
relationship between migration and ICL. The practices we observed in Greece and Australia are
spreading. The model of outsourcing responsibility in the treatment of the “migration crisis,” the
orchestration of a proactive policy of managing and deterring migration while seeking to keep
one’s hands clean, has been significantly developed.19 Most importantly, the European Union
has developed a strategy through both the EU-Turkey deal and the EU/Italy-Libya cooperation
for the detention, deportation and deterrence of asylum seekers.20 The United States, as well, is
using “safe third country” agreements with Latin and Central American counterparts,21 alongside
inhumane detention policies, to combine outsourcing and deterrence.
11See ICC Australia Communication, at 115.
12Office of the Prosecutor Letter, OTP-CR-65/17 (Feb. 20, 2017), on file with author.
13Office of the Prosecutor Letter, OTP-CR-65/17 (Apr. 11, 2017), on file with author.
14Kylar Lussikian,Dutton Hits Back at GetUp! Over Asylum Seeker Referral, THE AUSTRALIAN, (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.
theaustralian.com.au/nation/immigration/dutton-hits-back-at-getup-over-asylum-seeker-referral/news-story/
d31e1561c46f942b9a4f5c282c509800.
15See Helen Davidson, Australia Subjected Refugees to Crimes against Humanity, Class Actions Allege, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/dec/10/australia-subjected-refugees-to-crimes-against-humanity-class-
actions-allege.
16See Belden Norman Namah v. Hon. Rimbink Pato, Minister for Foreign Affairs and others, SC1497, (Apr. 26, 2016,
P.N.G.), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2812420-Manus-Island-Decision.html#document/p1;
Gabrielle Holly, Transnational Tort and Access to Remedy under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Kamasee v Commonwealth, 19(1) MELB. J. INT’L L. 52 (2018).
17For a critique of the “unfettered discretion” of the Prosecutor on temporal and other aspects of preliminary examinations
see Anni Pues, Towards the Golden Hour? A Critical Examination of the Length of Preliminary Examinations, 15 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 435 (2017). See also Carsten Stahn, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: Challenges and Critiques of Preliminary
Examinations at the ICC, 15 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 413 (2017).
18Office of the Prosecutor Letter, OTP-CR-65/17 (Feb. 12, 2020), on file with author [hereinafter OTP Response]. The
response is identical to one sent to Andrew Wilkie MP, who had also submitted a communication on the situation. For com-
mentary on the response(s) see Kevin Jon Heller, The OTP Lets Australia Off the Hook, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 17, 2020), http://
opiniojuris.org/2020/02/17/the-otp-lets-australia-off-the-hook/.
19For the emergence and evolution of these policies see Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & James C. Hathaway, Non-
Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 235 (2015).
20See Luiza Bialasiewicz, Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing the Borders of Europe: Libya and EU Border Work in the
Mediterranean, 17 GEOPOLITICS 843 (2012), See, more broadly, DAVID S. FITZGERALD, REFUGE BEYOND REACH: HOW
RICH DEMOCRACIES REPEL ASYLUM SEEKERS (2019).
21See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of
Guatemala on Cooperation Regarding the Examination of Protection Claims (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.federalregister.
gov/documents/2019/11/20/2019-25288/agreement-between-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-
government-of-the-republic.
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This Article examines violence against migrants as part of state deterrence policies, coupled
with efforts to use outsourcing to avoid responsibility and accountability for this violence, from
the perspective of ICL. It does not seek to demonstrate that all such practices constitute
international crimes, but asks how thinking about that violence through the prism of ICL both
illuminates certain features of the phenomenon of migration control practices and also awakens
the potential of ICL. This contribution is a reflection on ICL, its boundaries and its development
through strategic litigation.
I proceed in four parts. Firstly, I discuss the expressive labeling power of ICL and the concep-
tual and doctrinal battlegrounds for its application to migration control (Part B). I start with
observing the habitual associations drawn between migration and crime, as reflected in the
phenomenon of “crimmigration,” and ask what it would mean to reverse them. I then discuss
how key ICL categories, and specifically selected prohibited acts—murder, unlawful imprison-
ment and deportation, and persecution—and contextual elements of crimes against humanity,
apply to some migration control practices, although they do not ordinarily, as yet, attract such
grave labels. Rather than providing an exhaustive analysis of the legal elements, I aim to isolate
the key issues that arise before we can treat actions falling within the state’s sovereign right to
control migration as international crimes.
Secondly, I examine questions of liability for outsourced migration control in light of ICL’s
promise to trace responsibility in complex and collective structures and ask whether they can
challenge who we can imagine as a perpetrator of international crimes (Part C). Thirdly, I consider
how the transnational nature of the phenomenon of migration and the global potential for
emulation of violent policies against migration ought to influence the role of judicial institutions,
and especially the ICC, in applying its rules on jurisdiction and admissibility (Part D).
Finally, and having so far argued for the potential of ICL’s categories and institutions, I con-
sider the danger of fetishizing the legal regime and a punitive approach, before offering some con-
clusive thoughts that aim to bridge a critical approach to ICL with its use in meaningful strategic
litigation (Part E).
B. Labelling Violence Against Migrants
I. On the Relation between Migration and Criminalization
Immigration and criminalization are closely intertwined. Criminal law has played, and is increas-
ingly playing, a potent role in how irregular migration and migrants are treated and perceived. The
association of migration with crime and the proactive pursuit of that association is so deep and
multifaceted that it has merited a distinct sub-discipline, “crimmigration.”22 Alongside the rhet-
oric of threat and criminality increasingly present in public discourse,23 the association of immi-
gration and crime may be direct, through the criminalization of certain forms of migration.24
22See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56(2) AM. U. L. REV. 367 (Dec.
2006); Ben Bowling & Sophie Westenra, Crimmigration, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY AND
CONCEPTS 253 (Avi Brisman et al. eds., 2017); CRIMMIGRATION IN AUSTRALIA (Peter Billings ed., 2019); Cecilia Menjivar et al.,
The Expansion of “Crimmigration,” Mass Detention, and Deportation, 12 SOCIOLOGY COMPASS (2018); see also the work of the
Crimmigration Clinic at Harvard Law School, https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/clinical/crimmigration-clinic/.
23Bastian A. Vollmer, Policy Discourses on Irregular Migration in the EU – “Number Games” and “Political Games,” 13 EUR.
J. MIGRATION & L. 317, 320 (2011).
24See, e.g., Section 35, of the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (crim-
inalizing lack of cooperation in the process of obtaining documents to facilitate deportation). See Cathryn Costello, Victim or
Perpetrator? The Criminalised Migrant and the Idea of “Harm” in a Labour Market Context, in CRIMINALITY AT WORK (Alan
Bogg et al. eds., forthcoming 2020). Ryszard I. Cholewinski, The Criminalisation of Migration in EU Law and Policy, in WHOSE
FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE? EU IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY (Anneliese Baldaccini et al., 2007);
Elspeth Guild, Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications, (Council of Europe Issue Paper,
2009), http://cmr.jur.ru.nl/cmr/docs/criminalisation_en.pdf.
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More often, however, it will be indirect. The tool of criminalization may be directed at those
perceived as facilitating, allowing, or supporting migration. In this sense, the fight against irregular
migration is facilitated through the criminalization of the smugglers and the “disruption of their
business model.” An expanding regime of transnational criminal law obligates states to take a far-
reaching punitive approach,25 supported and militarized through Security Council resolutions.26
The expanding transnational criminal law regime against migrant smuggling is boosted through
the focus placed on smugglers and its attendant criminalization, and is frequently expanded to
include humanitarian organizations performing the role of search and rescue, which are accused
of being corrupt or whose humanitarian acts are criminalized for performing or benefiting the role
of smugglers.27
Finally, the criminalization of migrants occurs implicitly, and equally effectively, through their
treatment like convicted criminals. Their detention in carceral conditions would make it very dif-
ficult to think otherwise.28 It is therefore understandable that the newly elected US President,
when scrutinizing his Australian counterpart on the merits of a deal for the transfer of the
Manus Island and Nauru detainees made by his predecessor, found it hard to see the difference:
“I guarantee you they are bad. That is why they are in prison right now. They are not going to be
wonderful people who go on to work for the local milk people.”29
The formation of, and lacunae within, international migration and refugee law may also be
partly to blame here. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention calls for the non-prosecution for illegal
entry or presence of refugees who are “coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom
was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authoriza-
tion, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for
their illegal entry or presence,” but it has been narrowly interpreted in some jurisdictions as a
defense and has failed to significantly limit prosecutions.30 The struggle over the establishment
of a clear-cut right to receive asylum31 and the absence of a right to enter beyond specific treaty
provisions32 afford leeway and discretion in the assessment of claims that, while circumscribed by
specific rules like non-refoulement, may allow security or even punitive considerations to
25Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Dec. 12, 2000, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507.
26See S.C. Res. 2240, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2240 (Oct. 9, 2015), and S.C. Res. 2380, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2380 (Oct. 5, 2017).
27One such example is the case of Team Humanity, a Greek NGO. Since 2015, the NGO has provided assistance to the
Hellenic Coast Guard in the rescue of asylum seekers crossing the Aegean from Turkey to Lesvos, participating in more than
150 missions. In January 2016, Team Humanity’s director, Salam Aldeen, was prosecuted for the felony of illegal transport of
irregular migrants, in its aggravated form, with the use of “rescue as pretext.” He was eventually acquitted by the Court of
Appeals. GLAN filed a case at the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of Salam Aldeen, against Greece, which was,
however, summarily dismissed. See Case Filed against Greece in Strasbourg Court over Crackdown on Humanitarian
Organisations (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.glanlaw.org/single-post/2019/04/18/Case-filed-against-Greece-in-Strasbourg-
Court-over-Crackdown-on-Humanitarian-Organisations. See also the Research Social Platform on Migration and Asylum,
Crackdown on NGOs and Volunteers Helping Refugees and Other Migrants (2019), http://migpolgroup.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/06/Final-Synthetic-Report-Crackdown-on-NGOs-and-volunteers-helping-refugees-and-other-migrants_1.pdf.
See generally Eugenio Cusamano & James Pattison, The Non-Governmental Provision of Search and Rescue in the
Mediterranean and the Abdication of State Responsibility, 31 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 53 (2018).
28For the requirement, under EU law, to separate detained asylum seekers and “ordinary prisoners” see art. 16(1) of
Directive 2008/115. See also Joined Cases C-473/13 and C-514/13, Adala Bero v. Regierungspräsidium Kassel and
Ettayebi Bouzalmate v. Kreisverwaltung Kleve (July 17, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=155112&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=6428262.
29Greg Miller, Julie Vitkovskaya & Reuben Fischer-Baum, “This Deal Will Make Me Look Terrible”: Full Transcripts of
Trump’s Calls with Mexico and Australia, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2017/politics/australia-mexico-transcripts/. The reference to “the local milk people” remains unclear.
30Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. See also Cathryn Costello, Yulia Ioffe &
Teresa Büchsel, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy
Research Series PPLA/2017/01, 2017).
31See GUY S. GODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 7 (3rd ed. 2007); ITAMAR MANN,
HUMANITY AT SEA: MARITIME MIGRATION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 1 (2016).
32See VINCENT CHETAIL, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 119 (2019).
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dominate. The perceived strict distinction between those meriting refugee status because of a
credible fear of persecution and the “rest” creates a sense that the latter are undeserving and dan-
gerous chancers. The recognition of a sovereign right to detain asylum seekers and the absence of
strict upper limits for the duration of the detention, even if subject to procedural and human rights
limitations, similarly, and effectively, provides an avenue for punitive treatment.33
The close association of criminal law and migration therefore goes mostly one way: Irregular
migrants are cast as the criminals endangering states, not as victims of state crimes. This is no
surprise. Criminal law is long recognized as being primarily and predominantly in the service
of power—at least that of the state.34 In this context, international law has not proven capable
of overcoming domestic efforts to criminalize migration or to make migrants seem like prima
facie criminals. Indeed, the interpretation of international law as an apology of the power of dom-
inant (state) actors is, of course, a similarly well-established critique.35 These critiques become
even more poignant when applied to ICL. The regime’s relative youth, its rhetorical excess,
and the selectivity of its application have provided ample material for the observation that it
has primarily served as a tool against the weak.36 What is more, when it comes to the targets
of investigations and prosecutions at the ICC, the Court’s still predominant geographical focus
can be perceived to associate international criminality with the poorer parts of the world, where
immigrants come from.37 Finally, the exclusion from refugee status of individuals who have com-
mitted an international crime38 provides an ICL tool in the limitation of the provision of asylum
and reinforces the predominant relationship between migration and criminalization. Migrants are
therefore associated with criminality by virtue of their mere migration, directly or indirectly, in
domestic, transnational and international criminal law.
Would it be possible to explore the reversal of this configuration of power and criminalization?
Could the labeling power of (international) criminal law be deployed against the (powerful,
receiving) state? Could it be marshaled against those that treat migrants like criminals? What
would be the value of attempting to articulate a description and assessment of anti-migrant
policies and the violence against migrants using the categories of ICL?
My primary interest here is expressivist.39 The labels of the criminal law, from the construction
of its concepts to their application to specific acts, by specific actors, carry normative weight. The
33See the literature referred to in id. at 132 et seq and Cathryn Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject:
Immigration Detention under International Human Rights and EU Law, 19(1) IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STU. 257 (2012).
34A key figure for this critical association is, of course, Michel Foucault and his DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (1977). For an account
and a critique see DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY chs. 6 & 7 (1990).
35The seminal text here is MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005).
36Immi Tallgren’s question, in her early analysis of the Rome Conference, remains resonant: “Are we not just writing yet another
chapter to the stale story of the Strong and the Weak in international law?” Immi Tallgren, We Did It? The Vertigo of Law and
Everyday Life at the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 683, 695
(1999).
37See, e.g., Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Oct. 11–12, 2013, Decision no. 1:
Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1. For a discussion of
ICL from a Third World Approaches to International Law Perspective, see Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 167 (1997), and John Reynolds & Sujith Xavier, “The
Dark Corners of the World”: TWAIL and International Criminal Justice, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 959 (2016).
38Art. 1F(a) of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee
Convention]. See also art. 33(2) of the Refugee Convention (where the rule of non-refoulement “may not, however, be claimed
by a refugee : : : who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country”). See Sandesh Sivakumaran, Exclusion from Refugee Status: The Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations and Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention, 26 I.J.R.L 350 (2014). See also Catherine Dauvergne, The
Troublesome Intersections of Refugee Law and Criminal Law, in THE BORDERS OF PUNISHMENT: MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP
AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 76 (Katja Franko Aas & Mary Bosworth eds., 2013).
39For a classical starting point on criminal law’s function of expressing “a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral
condemnation of the community” see H.L.A. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958).
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law declares or creates a “punitive solidarity,”40 which, by identifying what and who is bad, con-
tributes to the coherence of the members of a society. The ambition of ICL has been even greater,
constructing such solidarity at a global level, and on the basis of purportedly universal values.
Through and beyond retribution and deterrence, ICL powerfully evokes and unleashes an expres-
sivist force. What is more, in both retrospective and prospective terms, the application of ICL can
influence political judgement as to who is, and who is not, on the right side of history.41
While a valid critique of ICL has been developed—and I return to it in the last part of this
Article—it is important to appreciate the implications of applying ICL to violence against
migrants. This turn to ICL is part of a wider conceptual battle concerning the types of violence
deemed the worst, and relatedly the baseline of protection for all humanity. It can express, in an
international system of deep inequalities of power and resources, who is the perpetrator and who
is the victim. Finally, the application of ICL requires us to appreciate the values that are being
attacked, in this instance, the values associated with migration itself and the liberty to pursue
a better life. It also engages the debate about the best use for ICL institutions.
To simplify, there are two ways to look at transnational migration and its protection. The first
one is exclusively humanitarian, and only protects people fleeing persecution and threats to their
life and limb, undertaking a perilous journey, and requesting asylum. The role of international law
is one of minimal protection of what has been termed “bare life.”42 It is apolitical, of elementary
universality, and anchored in an understanding of humanity associated with survival and physical
suffering. The second way of addressing the phenomenon of migration appreciates its structural
features. In this view, migration is not only the avoidance of suffering and death, it is also the
proactive pursuit of a better life; it is not an appeal to an apolitical guarantee of humanity, it
is a phenomenon reflecting movements across and against structures of political and economic
inequality—triggered by violence and danger, but ultimately due to that very inequality.
We can observe similar faultlines in the debates over international crimes. International crimi-
nal law is often perceived, with some justification, as eschewing larger questions of inequality
or structural violence and elevating narrower and also more spectacular types of violence and
suffering.43 Appreciating the social value of transnational migration in our analysis of the violence
wielded against migrants can help us investigate whether ICL can go beyond the narrow violence
against “bare life.”44
The traditional association between criminality and migration, one directed against migrants,
and the predominant focus of ICL on physical violence committed in the poorer parts of the
world, make it hard to associate violence against migrants with international crimes, and to
see those conducting it as perpetrators of such crimes. In what follows, I want to explore how
key categories of ICL can apply to policies involving violence against migrants, with the purpose
of deterring migration flows, in order to challenge that assumption.
See also Saira Mohamed, Deviance, Aspiration, and the Stories We Tell: Reconciling Mass Atrocity and the Criminal Law, 124
YALE L.J. 1628 (2015), for ICL’s “aspirational expressivism,” and Barrie Sander, The Expressivist Turn of International
Criminal Justice: A Field in Search of Meaning, 32(4) L.J.I.L. 851 (2019) for an excellent taxonomy of different types of expres-
sivism and the characterization of GLAN’s ICL work as “strategic expressivism.”
40The starting point here has been the philosophy of Durkheim and his THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY. See Garland,
supra note 34, at chs 2 & 3. See also Henrique Carvalho & Anastasia Chamberlen, Why Punishment Pleases: Punitive Feelings
in a World of Hostile Solidarity, 20(2) PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 217 (2018).
41For a guide to the historical work of international criminal trials see Barrie Sander, History on Trial: Historical Narrative
Pluralism within and beyond International Criminal Courts, 67 I.C.L.Q. 547 (2018).
42The concept is from GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998). See ITAMAR MANN,
HUMANITY AT SEA Introduction (2016).
43Kalpouzos & Mann, supra note 5.
44See also Itamar Mann, Crimes against Refugees as Crimes against Humanity (draft on file with the author) (discussing
whether the limitation of the liberty of migration can serve the ossification of structures of inequality and whether this sup-
ports a turn to ICL in response).
German Law Journal 577
II. The Conceptual Battlegrounds of Crimes against Humanity
Crimes against humanity are defined in both customary international law and treaty, most notably
article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, as a series of prohibited acts, some of which will be
discussed below, “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population.”45 The application of the category of crimes against humanity to violence against
migrants entails engagement with key conceptual battles related to their definition and meaning.46
One can start with the prohibited acts, seen by the law as potentially constituting the overall attack,
before turning to their breadth or systematicity (the so-called context element).47
1. Murder
The first such act is the most elusively simple one: “murder.” The challenge here is whether we can
understand murder in some way differently from a physically and somatically violent proximal act
where the consequences of the perpetrator’s actions in taking another person’s life are manifest.
Can the legal concept of murder accommodate the distance that current migration control prac-
tices employ? The Elements of Crimes facilitate this move by equating the act of killing, as part of
the crime of murder, with “causing death,”48 whether by act or omission. The deaths of many
migrants as a consequence of developed states’ policies of migration deterrence occur not through
direct acts of murder (such as the shooting of a migrant by a police officer) but often as a result of
distancing practices. Such policies include the outsourcing of migration control through the estab-
lishment or support of detention centers in third states49 or the establishment of zones of danger
through which migrants need to travel in peril.50 At the very least, such measures significantly
increase the risk of death.51 Such distance and such danger are established through proactive pol-
icies of empowering third states to intercept and to block migrants’ journeys to claim asylum52 and
through the ceasing or withholding of lifesaving operations to provide rescue in the migrant’s
immediate attempt to reach the territory where they can claim asylum. It is also established
through push-backs to areas of danger. Crucially, states complement the proactive creation of that
45While specific prohibited acts are addressed in other treaty texts, unlike with the crime of genocide, there has not yet been
a distinct treaty text on crimes against humanity. For the UN International Law Commission’s work towards a potential
codification see the Analytical Guide, https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/7_7.shtml. And see FORGING A CONVENTION ON
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011).
46For the evolution of law from the point of view of conceptual history, highlighting the “polemical” nature of legal concepts
and the debates surrounding them, see Martti Koskenniemi, A History of International Law Histories, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 943, 968–69 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012).
47The ones discussed below are only a selection. In cases related to violence against migrants, other prohibited acts poten-
tially constituting crimes against humanity may have been committed. For example, the Australia ICC submission, at 74–87,
also details reasonable grounds to believe the crimes of torture (art. 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute) and other inhumane acts (art.
7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute) were committed.
48ICC Elements of Crimes 7(1)(a)(1) and footnote 7. The Elements of Crime are an official, if not binding, aid to the Court’s
interpretation of its Statute.
49See, e.g., Sally Hayden, Deaths Pile up in Libyan Detention Centre, Leaked UN Report Shows, THE IRISH TIMES (June 25,
2019).
50For the tracking of deaths in the Mediterranean see the International Organization of Migration monitoring, https://
missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean. See also Agnes Callamard, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human
Rights Council on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary executions, U.N. Doc. A/72/335 (Aug. 15, 2017).
51To the extent that the perpetrators had knowledge that the consequence (of death) was likely, may have hoped it would
not come about, but accepted its likely event in order to achieve their primary purpose (of curbing and deterring migration),
we would be speaking not of dolus directus or indirectus but of dolus eventualis, a civil law concept of intent akin to, but slightly
higher than, common law recklessness. The acceptability of dolus eventualis under art. 30, the default mental element of the
Rome Statute, is the subject of debate. See, e.g., Mohamed E. Badar, The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 19 CRIM. L. FORUM 473 (2008).
52A recent example of such measures is the Greek Ministry of Defense’s advertisement, on Jan. 24, 2020, for the procure-
ment of floating barriers to block the passage of asylum seekers. The document can be found at http://army.gr/sites/default/
files/asdys_dpm_2.pdf.
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distance, which has predictable consequences, with the omission of acts that would avert such
consequences.
Omission is equated with action when there is a legal duty to act. Doctrinally, therefore, part of
the battle relates to the understanding of what constitutes a legally relevant omission and what the
legal obligation to act is. The establishment of such a duty in law, and its territorial reach, will depend
on a number of legal regimes, including positive duties under international human rights law. In
some scenarios, the law of the sea and the specific regulation of search and rescue operations are
pertinent. Establishing positive duties to act extraterritorially is difficult. Even if there is a specific or
general duty to protect,53 this will not extend to a general obligation beyond the state’s maritime
zones, apart from instances where a flag vessel is in a position to de facto exercise the control that
would allow it to protect the right to life.54 A legal duty to act, however, can also be constituted
through a prior act that has led to the creation of danger that certain consequences will occur.55
Therefore, there are two ways of conceptualizing the combination of action and omission and
their role in the causing of death. The first is one based on omission, starting from the observation
that states fail to avert death, and arguing for a legal duty, even if one cannot be established in
extraterritorial search and rescue obligations, resulting from the states’ prior endangerment of the
migrants through their policies of making it harder and more dangerous for them to make the
journey to claim asylum. The second calls for an integrated understanding of acts and omissions
demonstrated in such policies. According to this approach the deaths are a direct consequence
either of the distancing measures or of states’ actions to stop rescue efforts. The latter could
be observed in European states’ decision to shift from Operation Mare Nostrum to Operation
Triton, through which Italy in cooperation with the European Union stopped patrolling the
sea outside its territorial waters in the knowledge that this would lead to the death of migrants.56
This analysis sees inaction as action, that is proactive withdrawal, with extra-territorial effects. As
with the failure to act, the withdrawal of an action will be legally relevant if there is a duty to
sustain it, either a positive legal duty or one based on the effects of prior action. Even if we accept
the causal link between these policies and the deaths of migrants, at least as a conditio sine qua non
with normative weight, we should appreciate that these arguments seem stretched and hard to
make. This is because the default position of the law of murder, within the regimes of ICL
and general international law, favors those who are able to maintain distance between their actions
and their consequences.
2. Imprisonment
At the heart of anti-migrant policies is the practice of detention. Such detention occurs in the
territory of Western states, in more or less lawful and humane ways, but it is also a component
of the extra-territorial outsourcing of such policies. The detention of migrants in Libya, on behalf
of the European Union, and in Manus Island and Nauru, on behalf of Australia, are important
examples. The question for ICL is whether “unlawful imprisonment”57 is limited to an
53See IRINI PAPANICOLOPULU, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE AT SEA ch. 4 (2018).
54For the discussion of these questions in this Special Issue, see Nikolas Feith Tan & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen,
A Topographical Approach to Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Migration Control, in this issue; Itamar
Mann, The Right to Perform Rescue at Sea: Jurisprudence and Drowning, in this issue; Efthymios Papastavridis, The
European Convention of Human Rights and Migration at Sea: Reading the “Jurisdictional Threshold” of the Convention
Under the Law of the Sea Paradigm, in this issue.
55See Michael Duttwiler, Liability for Omission in International Criminal Law, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2006); MILES
JACKSON, COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (2015).
56See also Omer Shatz & Juan Branco, Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on EUMigration Policies in the Central Mediterranean and Libya (2014–2019), para.
604 et seq. (2019), https://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/jun/eu-icc-case-EU-Migration-Policies.pdf.
57Art. 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute refers to “unlawful imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in vio-
lation of fundamental rules of international law.”
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irredeemably arbitrary process of physical incarceration by violent and illegitimate actors. We see
such spectacular arbitrariness in armed conflicts that have provided the material for the existing
jurisprudence of ICL on the question of detention and are associated with a sadistic and exceed-
ingly violent treatment of detained human beings, as evidenced most spectacularly in jurispru-
dence ranging from the Second World War58 to the former Yugoslavia.59 The definition of
unlawful imprisonment is doctrinally primarily dependent on its arbitrariness,60 with the inhu-
manity of its conditions playing a secondary, bolstering, role.61 Accordingly, both the nature of the
actors, and their procedures, and the cruelty and inhumanity of their behavior, which may often
include an element of sexual violence,62 make up the picture of the prohibited act.
While such behavior also occurs in migrant detention,63 the challenge is whether the interpre-
tation of the prohibited act is able to capture the structure of indefinite detention organized by well-
functioning and democratic states related to, and despite, the discretion international law grants to
such states in the enforcement of their borders. There are a few difficulties to start with: Firstly, the
very practice of detention for the purposes of processing is neither per se unlawful, nor is it crimi-
nal.64 Secondly, procedural guarantees, perhaps not unlike those associated with (temporary) dep-
rivation of liberty more generally, are a matter of debate.65 Thirdly, the absence of absolute temporal
limits for detention blurs the line between prolonged and indefinite. To the extent that the power to
detain is linked with the sovereign’s prerogative to control and process, and to the extent that it is not
a form of violence that is as spectacular as direct physical harm, it is hard to place at the heart of the
powerful ICL category of crimes against humanity (CAH). And yet, it is at the heart of a deep, far-
reaching and systemic exercise of violence on asylum seekers.66 It perceived as successful in part
because of its very arbitrariness, the spear of the punitive function of anti-migrant violence.
The violence of detention attacks the very value that migrants are exercising, namely the free-
dom to move and, by moving, seek a better life. Physical liberty is at the heart of the phenomenon
of migration, and values that the international normative system recognizes and protects.
Therefore, the punitive—as well as arbitrary and inhumane—deprivation of that liberty is at
the heart of the violence exercised against particular human beings as well as against the value
58Imprisonment was not included as a separate prohibited act in the Nuremberg and Tokyo statutes but was first included
in the category through Allied Control Council Law No. 10, art. II para. 1 (c).
59See, e.g., Dario Kordic´ & Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 26, 2001), where the Trial Chamber found, para. 781–2 that the whole village of Rotilj within the Kiseljak municipality was
turned into “a detention camp for Muslims from the other villages in the municipality, together with the surviving Muslims from
Rotilj itself.” See also Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgement, Trial Chamber (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002) (addressing the violence in the infamous KP Dom detention camp in Foča).
60See Dario Kordic´ & Mario Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber, para. 116 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004).
61SeeOTTOTRIFFTERER&KAI AMBOS, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ACOMMENTARY (2015), mar-
ginal note 51, with reference on further sources for the substantive human rights law of treatment of detainees. TheOTPResponse, in
accepting that “multiple acts of imprisonmentor severedeprivationof liberty”underart. 7(1)(e)were committed, andwhilenoting the
durationof the imprisonment, didnot address its arbitrarynature, but focusedon the conditionsof thedetention.Thisparticular focus
facilitated the OTP treating the detention as conditions that Australia “fail[ed] : : : to take adequate measures to address” and not as
Australia’s “organizational policy” constituting crimes against humanity. This is further discussed below.
62This can be addressed through the act of sexual slavery in art. 7(1)(g). See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T,
Trial Chamber (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (on the “rape camps” in the former Yugoslavia).
63For sexual violence in detention in Australia see PHILIP MOSS, REVIEW INTO RECENT ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO
CONDITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE REGIONAL PROCESSING CENTRE IN NAURU 3–5 (Feb. 6, 2015) [hereinafter the
Moss Report]; See also U.N. Support Mission in Libya & Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Desperate
and Dangerous: Report on the Human Rights Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Libya, at 45–47 (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/LibyaMigrationReport.pdf.
64CHETAIL, supra note 37, at 134.
65See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35 on Article 9 (Liberty and Security of the Person), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/35, para. 18 (Dec. 18, 2018) (on immigration detention).
66Boochani, supra note 1.
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of migration in general. The application of that particular category of CAH to detention practices
challenges ICL to capture this. The ICC Australia Communication tried to do this, placing unlaw-
ful imprisonment at the center of the overall policy, and highlighting the carceral nature of the
deprivation of liberty, the arbitrariness and unlawfulness of the process, and its indefinite char-
acter.67 This indefiniteness, as reflected in the quotes by Behrouz Boochani opening this article, is
at the heart of both the arbitrary and inhumane nature of the policy of detention, reaching the
particular depth of the violence against migrants seeking freedom and a better life.
3. Deportation
Related, in doctrinal, conceptual, political and practical terms, is the practice of deportation. As a
crime, it is defined in the Rome Statute as the “forced displacement of the persons concerned by
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds
permitted under international law.” The definition, while capturing the direct or indirect violence
by de jure or de facto state agents,68 imports the regulatory framework of international refugee
and migration law, and its attendant debates. How can the rules governing the prohibition of
refoulement and collective expulsion, as well as the process of deportation of migrants,69 translate
into the expressively powerful imaginary of ICL? Can this be applied to the well-organized policies
of developed states and international organizations, from the US70 to Australia and the EU? Or
does the procedural efficiency of a well-organized developed state, evoking at least a minimal
understanding of the rule of law, preclude our understanding of the practice as criminal?
The crime of deportation requires the forcible displacement, within the territory of a state or
across an international border, without permitted grounds under international law, of individuals
who are lawfully present. The forcible nature of the displacement will be clear in cases where
physical violence is used. However, the deportation of migrants may also include coercive circum-
stances, such as when detainees are “convinced” to agree to their removal as their only alternative
to inhumane indefinite detention.71 The criterion of lawful presence poses more difficult ques-
tions. For the move to ICL, it is important to stress that such lawfulness is governed by
international law, challenging the assumed prerogative of states in immigration matters.72
67ICC Australia Communication, at 63–73, including references to relevant findings by Human Rights bodies. See also
Kalpouzos & Mann, supra note 5, at 14–16 for the practice in Greece up to 2015. On the detention of migrants in Libya
see the UNHCR Report cited supra 63. The latter example, given the spectacular nature of the violence and the perceived
illegitimacy of many detaining actors and authorities doesn’t pose many challenges for the application of ICL. The question
there is its attribution to the cooperating European states, discussed below.
68See ICC Australia Communication, at 87–92. The practice of illegal push-backs reported at the Evros border in North-
Eastern Greece is the focus of a collaboration between GLAN and the Greek NGO HumanRights360. See HumanRights360,
Ending Violent “Pushbacks” of Refugees and Migrants at the Greek-Turkish Border, https://www.humanrights360.org/new-
project-ending-violent-pushbacks-of-refugees-and-migrants-at-the-greek-turkish-border/.
69SeeMichelle Hackman & Alicia Caldwell, Immigration Tent Courts at Border Raise Due-Process Concerns, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/immigration-tent-courts-at-border-raise-due-process-concerns-1157633
2002: “The unique conditions of [immigration] tent courts [at the border] deny migrants due process by depriving them of mean-
ingful access to lawyers or interaction with judges, making the setup essentially a rubber stamp for deportation.”
70Jaya Rajmi-Nogales, Non-Refoulement under the Trump Administration, 23(11) ASIL INSIGHTS (2019), https://www.asil.
org/insights/volume/23/issue/11/non-refoulement-under-trump-administration. It should be clarified that the amount of
deportations has been high under previous US administrations as well. See Anthony W. Fontes, The Long, Bipartisan
History of Dealing with Immigrants Harshly, THE CHICAGO REPORTER (Jul. 11, 2019), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/
the-long-bipartisan-history-of-dealing-with-immigrants-harshly/.
71Beyond physical coercion; for the coercion exercised on asylum seekers in the Australia immigration system see Ben
Doherty, It’s Simply Coercion: Manus Island, Immigration Policy, and the Men with No Future, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 28,
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/sep/29/its-simply-coercion-manus-island-immigration-policy-
and-the-men-with-no-future. On the insufficiency of “apparent consent” under threat see Prosecutor v. Simic, Tadic, and
Zaric, Case No. IT-95-9-T, T.Ch. II, Judgement, para. 125 (Oct. 17, 2003).
72See Vincent Chetail, Is There Blood on my Hands? Deportation as a Crime in International Law, 29(3) LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
917, 925 (2016).
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However, the absence of a general right to entry limits the recourse to international law to the
exception of refugees and asylum seekers, whose presence is lawful at least as long as their claim
is pending.73 The grounds of expulsion are also governed by international human rights law and
the principle of non-refoulement.74
Of course, not every unlawful removal of migrants engages ICL by constituting a crime against
humanity. Qualitative and quantitative seriousness—the requisite gravity and the context of a
widespread systematic attack—is required in order to transform a practice that is at the very heart
of the modern sovereign state’s control over its borders and territory from unlawful into criminal.
Our application of the capacious expressive categories of ICL challenges us to see this practice as
having travelled to the other edge of legality, that of international criminality, and not only across
the line separating legal and illegal. Again, while it is perhaps easier to imagine deportations
(or forcible internal transfers) in the inherently violent situation of armed conflict, linked with
exterminatory practices and intent,75 some imaginative work is required in order to associate such
criminal labeling with democratic states’ policies in times of peace.
4. Persecution
Finally, similar challenges are posed by the application of the prohibited act of “persecution.” The
Rome Statute defines it as “the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary
to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”76 The general reference
to fundamental rights, even as qualified by severity, arguably denotes this as the most complex and
expansive subcategory of crimes against humanity. What is more, persecution reflects a strand
distinct from the other prohibited acts, constituting its own “type” of crime against humanity
as set out in the first articulation of the category in the Nuremberg Charter.77 In this sense,
the crime of persecution refers to the fundamental failure, and intentional betrayal, of the
obligations of governance towards a population under one’s jurisdiction, reflected in the entire
body of human rights law. Its application to migration therefore brings to ICL the difficult
questions associated with the application of human rights law to the relationship between a state
(or international organization) and migrant non-citizens. This may be in relation to acts that
73Id. at 926.
74Id. at 926–29. ICC Australia Communication, at 90–1. In its Response to our Communication, however, the OTP seems to
deny any link between the right to claim asylum and “lawful presence” under art. 7(1)(d). The OTP argued “that while the
removal of migrants or asylum seekers to territories where they would be subjected to [cruel, inhuman and degrading treat-
ment] would engage a State’s human rights obligations, this does not affect the distinct legal question of whether the persons to
be so removed were ‘lawfully present’ for the purpose of international criminal law and the crime of deportation. To consider
otherwise would render the question of lawful presence under that provision relative to, or dependent on, the legality of a
person’s subsequent treatment. Such a circular approach would arguably be the opposite of the logic of the elements of the
crime under article 7(1)(d), which seeks to ensure that only if persons are lawfully present are (sic) they protected from depor-
tation or forcible transfer without grounds permitted under international law.” The OTP does not provide a clear logic
for what it considers necessary for “lawful presence” and by arguing, effectively, that “lawful presence” should mean that
“only : : : persons lawfully present” should be protected is, itself, circular. It should be added that the OTP seems to apply
this analysis to asylum seekers “intercepted either in international waters or in Australia’s territorial waters.” OTP Response
75Here the example of Myanmar is important. For deportation as genocide see Chetail, supra note 72, at 933 et seq.
76Rome Statute art. 7(2)(g). See also Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgement, para.
697 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, May 7, 1997).
77Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major
war criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. Art. 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter referred to crimes against humanity as: “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of the law of the country where perpetrated.” This formulation has led to a separation between “murder-type”
and “persecution-type” crimes against humanity. See UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 192–94 (1948).
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constitute crimes under other provisions of crimes against humanity,78 or “behaviors that do not
in themselves satisfy the listed definitions.”79
While potentially entailing physical violence, the crime of persecution is paradigmatically
committed through the bureaucratic development of discriminatory policies, potentially capturing
legislative and executive action far removed from those it affects. The discriminatory core of the
crime of persecution highlights the difference in how irregular migrants, as opposed to people regu-
larly present on the territory of a state, are being treated.80 Moreover, the substantive content of the
crime of persecution, referring to fundamental rights that need to be protected, when applied to state
policy, requires an acceptance that there is a relationship of governance and rights protection, even
in relation to categories of people that the state would rather not be responsible for and admit on its
territory. This relationship requires that the state does not intentionally violate their fundamental
rights, in its territory and extra-territorially. Similarly to the other prohibited acts, the application of
the crime of persecution to migration policy challenges us to understand the link between situations
of systematic aggression where the state is “going after” a certain category of people with the sit-
uations where the state just wants nothing to do with them. In this way, it brings to the fore the claim
at the very heart of the practice of migration, which is a claim to a humanity that is not just that of
bare life, but also that of acceptance, inclusion and protection in (international) society.
5. Part of an Overall Attack
Prohibited acts, such as those described above, only constitute “crimes against humanity” if they
are part of a “widespread or a systematic attack,” which reflects a policy,81 “directed against any
civilian population.” The widespread or systematic nature of some of the acts described above
depends on their integration and development within the states’ migration policies. To the extent
that some of these acts openly serve these policies, their systematic nature will be manifest. In
terms of the definition of “attack,” too, the doctrine is rather uncontroversially on the side of mak-
ing this argument: It is clear that an “attack” does not require a “military attack,” or require spec-
tacular aggression appearing “out of the blue,” but merely describes a “course of conduct,”82 which
can be constituted by both physically violent and also purely administrative (at all levels of legis-
lative, executive or judicial practice) acts or omissions.83 And yet, it remains intuitively difficult to
78The ICC Australia Communication, at 92–96, focused on persecutory acts of torture, unlawful imprisonment, deporta-
tion, and inhumane treatment.
79Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, para. 703 et seq (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May
7, 1997).
80A case in point here is the particular policy of Australia in mistreating not migrants in general (although such mistreatment
is also not absent) but specifically the ones arriving by boats. That was also part of what the Australian PM tried to explain to the
US President in answering his question: “What is the thing with boats? Why do you discriminate against boats?” This has led
some analysts to suggest that the operative category of discrimination is the “mode of arrival.” See Claire Henderson, Australia’s
Treatment of Asylum Seekers: From Human Rights Violations to Crimes against Humanity, 12 J.I.C.J. 1180 (2014). In the ICC
Australia Communication, at 94–95, it was argued that, on the contrary, the discrimination was against migrants in general, even
if it was operationalized against those arriving by boat. The OTP Response found that the underlying acts potentially constituting
persecution did “not appear to have been committed on persecutory grounds,” without more.
81There has been debate over whether an actual “policy” is required and the level of organization necessary to conduct such
a policy. In this instance, the fact that the Rome Statute refers to “a State or organizational policy” and the fact that the policies
discussed are not those of precariously and barely organized non-state groups as some of the jurisprudence of the ICC, prob-
lematically, has allowed. See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Trial Chamber II, at 144 (Mar. 7, 2014). We will not need to discuss this further.
82See ICC Elements of Crimes, Introduction to article 7. See also Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08PTC II,
para. 85 (June 15, 2009). On what the course of conduct may entail, see Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Laurent Gbagbo, para. 208–21 (June 12, 2014).
83For an examination of examples in the context of the overall concept see David Luban, A Theory of Crimes against
Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85 (2004), who does, however, argue, at 101–2, that the attack requires something more
“dynamic, : : : moving, and ongoing” than “the erection of a stable system of group subordination or oppression.”
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understand certain acts entailed in migration control policies as an “attack.”84 The assumption is
that the state policies are a “response” to a pre-existing phenomenon, and one that is well within
the rights, indeed the responsibilities, of a state. Therefore, if such a response contains elements of
unlawfulness, even if these elements are widespread, there is too much space to traverse in order to
characterize such actions as an overall “attack” constituting crimes against humanity.
The OTP Response to the ICC Australia Communication is exemplary of the traditional
approach. The OTP could not find that Australia’s “failure : : : to take adequate measures to
address the conditions of the detentions : : : was deliberately aimed at encouraging an ‘attack.’”
While conceding the role of deterrence at the heart of Australia’s offshore detention policy, the
OTP did not find that the unlawful aspects of the detention were “a deliberate, or purposefully
designed, aspect of this policy.” It also found that no other actor, including the corporations run-
ning the camps or the governments of Nauru or Papua New Guinea, had such a policy, thus
rejecting the possibility of joint or accessorial liability. This analysis ignores the ample evidence
that the conditions were deliberately created in order to serve such a deterrent purpose.85
Crucially, it sees both the arbitrary and inhumane nature of the detention not as the consequence
of Australian government and corporate actions but as something that is created by itself, outside
anyone’s responsibility,86 and which Australian agents simply, and not deliberately, failed to
assuage.87 The OTP position thus reinforces the traditional and continuous focus on “radical”
or “spectacular” criminality. Western states may be guilty of “not doing enough in response,”
but the OTP’s imaginary seems unable to understand this as an “attack.”
Against such a stance, it is important to attempt to apply the lex lata to situations not naturally
associated with it in order to both unlock the potential expressive range of the rules and expose
increasingly normalized behavior to a revealing light. The doctrinal battles, whether over the pro-
hibited acts or the contextual elements, are inscribed in a broader debate over the evolution, and
definition, of the concept of crimes against humanity. What kind of phenomena, what kind of
violence, what kind of relationships, what kind of perpetrators and victims does it seek to express?
The initial establishment of the concept, as has been both historically and philosophically
explained,88 captured a relationship of radical asymmetry of power, between a well-established
and organized entity and a plurality of people who are vulnerable in relation to that power.
That very asymmetry of power rested upon, and indicated, responsibilities of governance—or
at least not their violent betrayal. The evolution of the concept of crimes against humanity, most
notably through the gradual decrease of the required level of organization necessary to direct a
policy, has allowed the application of the concept to increasingly disorganized non-state entities,89
from armed groups to terrorist organizations and potentially corporations, which, while function-
ally able to cause consequences to fall under the prohibited acts, have moved the concept away
from its original design. In that sense a perceivably radical application of crimes against humanity
84I should say here that in the context of discussing, presenting, and debating the legal argument in relation to Australia, one
of the major areas of push-back I experienced has been in understanding the policies as an “attack.” Interestingly, such push-
back has been less forthcoming from ICL scholars, for reasons explained in the next sentence of the text, and more from
human rights and refugee law scholars, perhaps reflecting the broader perception of the technical term.
85See, e.g., ICC Australia Communication at 14–15.
86See also Heller, supra note 18.
87The requirement that the prohibited acts be “deliberately aimed at encouraging an ‘attack’” seems to refer to footnote 6 in
the ICC Elements of Crime. This states that “[a] policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be
implemented by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a delib-
erate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a policy cannot be
inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organizational action.” (I thank Kevin Heller for suggesting this.)
88See Luban, supra note 83; CHERIF M. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION ch. 1 (Legal Nature) (2011).
89Supra note 81. For an account of the functional expansion of the criterion of organization, and criteria on its limits,
see also Tilman Rodenhäuser, Beyond State Crimes: Non-State Entities and Crimes against Humanity, 27(4) LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 913 (2014).
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to violence against migrants may be seen as a return to the concept as originally imagined, while at
the same time reflecting the modalities and responsibilities inherent in evolving global asymmet-
rical relationships of power.
Ultimately, the concept that the crime seeks to express carries a certain understanding of
“humanity” itself, that most elusively capacious word. There is an important intersection between,
on the one hand, the political and philosophical understanding of humanity in migration and, on
the other hand, the role that the concept of humanity plays in the construction of the category of
crimes against humanity in ICL. In both cases, there is a philosophical and political trajectory
from the physical to the social. As introduced above, at the one end there is what has been called
“bare life,”90 the very survival of the migrant, achieved through the rescue from persecution and
the perilous journey. Accordingly, the violence most offensive to humanity, and ICL’s priority, is
the one that causes the most physical suffering and death. At the other end, we can appreciate
migration as displaying humanity’s transcendence of an apolitical “bare life,” the overcoming
of passive vulnerability, and a political claim made through the (perilous) exercise of physical
liberty. Migration can even be conceived as a response to and against the global inequalities
between North and South, a process of decolonization.91 This stance entails the appreciation
of humanity as a social, relational concept. The attack against this value is not foreign to ICL,
despite the fact that the predominant interpretation and practice of ICL has focused on the physi-
cal. Through an application and interpretation of crimes against humanity that, with reference to
the social function of migration, emphasizes the structural features of ICL, we pose our under-
standing of what humanity needs to be defended. In this context, ICL can be used to highlight not
only that migration is not a marginal, anomalous, innately wrong, or deviant practice—but also
that it reflects a set of rich values inherent in humanity, which transcend the mere protection of life
and also include the migrants’ agency displayed in their liberty to move against the currents of
global inequality.
C. Outsourcing and Avoiding Responsibility
I. The Developing Practice of Distance
The expressive power of (international) criminal law in labeling particular types of behavior and
violence as criminal is only realized when such behavior is linked to individual moral actors.
Conversely, the disposition to ignore or hide the gravity, in the broader sense, of the violence against
migrants in structural arrangements is complemented by the avoidance of individual criminal
responsibility for that violence. Both the wielding of the violence and the avoidance of responsibility
are served by the establishment of distance.92 The desire of states to create such distance, from both
migrants and the potential obligations associated with them, have led to an increasingly sophisti-
cated set of practices the aim of which is to avoid, outsource, and distance responsibility, account-
ability, and liability. Such practices focus on the creation of distance in mainly two ways: physical
distance, through extra-territorial “migration management” as far removed as possible; and moral
and legal distance, through the employment of other state and non-state actors.
The example of Australia displays many of these features. The Australian punitive detention
system very much focused on avoiding any contact between migrants and asylum territory,
through interception at sea93 and the establishment of the camps in the territory of Nauru
90See supra note 42.
91Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509 (2019).
92The establishment of distance and the weakening of responsibility in the wielding of violence is also a central feature in the
evolution of war. See Ioannis Kalpouzos, Double Elevation: Autonomous Weapons and the Search for an Irreducible
International Law, LEIDEN J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020).
93See the analysis from the Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.
edu.au/publication/turning-back-boats-0. For an analysis of the Australian practice of “pushbacks” (including “takebacks” and
German Law Journal 585
and Manus Island, Papua New Guinea. These two states were also tasked, and financially moti-
vated, to “own” the camps.94 Finally, reflecting the increasing privatization of “migration man-
agement,” a series of corporations were contracted to run the camps.95
The EU model follows similar techniques in both major fronts. On the Eastern Mediterranean,
the EU-Turkey agreement has entailed generous financial and geopolitical incentives in order to
defer the management of a crucial migration route, stemming from the war in Syria, to the Turkish
state. In the context of the North Africa migration route, the EU and specific states, most signifi-
cantly Italy, have struck similar agreements with the government of Libya,96 but also with
sub-state actors such as the Libyan Coast Guard, which are known to be engaging in trafficking,
slavery, torture, and other human rights violations.97 Both alliances are central to the creation of
distance and the avoidance of responsibility. To the extent that migrants overcome those barriers
and reach the territory of an EU member state, a complex legislative and executive net places
responsibility, to the extent possible, on relatively weaker EU border states.98
On the other side of the Atlantic, even though the current US administration seems happy to be
openly associated with particular practices of arbitrary detention and inhumane treatment of
migrant populations at the US/Mexico border, these practices have always been combined with
efforts to outsource and avoid responsibility through agreements with Central and Southern
American states.99
On all these fronts the states seem to either proactively or passively encourage the involvement
of private or other non-state actors. The Australian model of the use of private security corpo-
rations is shared, perhaps unsurprisingly, by the US approach to its southern border. In order to
“turnbacks”) see the report by the University of Goldsmith and Forensic Oceanography, in collaboration with GLAN, entitled
“Unless the Water is Safer than the Lane” (Nov. 2017), https://www.gold.ac.uk/media/images-by-section/departments/
research-centres-and-units/research-centres/centre-for-research-architecture/Live-Project_CRA_2017.pdf.
94Before the Australian Parliamentary Select Committee on the Recent Allegations Relating to Conditions and
Circumstances at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru, the secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border
Protection, Mr. Michael Pezzullo “reaffirmed the department’s position: The Australian government does not run the
Nauru Regional Processing Centre, or RPC. It is managed by the government of Nauru, under Nauruan law, with support
from the Australian government. The government of Nauru operates the RPC, assesses asylum claims and, where persons are
found to be in need of protection, arranges settlement. The government of Nauru is specifically responsible for security and
good order and the care and welfare of persons residing in the centre.” See Final Report: Taking Responsibility: Conditions and
Circumstances at Australia’s Regional Processing Centre in Nauru (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_
Business/Committees/Senate/Regional_processing_Nauru/Regional_processing_Nauru/Final%20Report/c02.
95For the reports on the role of corporations see No Business in Abuse, Transfield’s Complicity in Gross Human Rights Abuses
within Australia’s Offshore Detention Regime (Nov. 2015), https://d68ej2dhhub09.cloudfront.net/1321-NBIA_Report-20Nov
2015b.pdf; Amnesty International, Treasure Island: How Companies are Profiting from Australia’s Abuse of Refugees on
Nauru (Apr. 2017), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/treasure_island_briefing_final5_0.pdf; for an
analysis of the role and knowledge of corporate actors see ICC Australia Communication, at 56–58.
96SeeMemorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Fields of Development, the Fight against Illegal Immigration,
Human Trafficking and Fuel Smuggling and on Reinforcing the Security of Borders between the State of Libya and the Italian
Republic (unofficial translation), https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translation
_finalversion.doc.pdf. See Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (Feb. 23, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-109231.
97See EU Council, Note on Libya and the Surrounding Area: Current Situation and Need for Immediate Action (Sep. 4,
2019) (prepared for the High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration on Sept. 17, 2019), http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2019/sep/eu-council-libya-11538-19.pdf; Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Bridging the Protection
Gap for Refugees andMigrants in the Mediterranean (May 2019), https://rm.coe.int/lives-saved-rights-protected-bridging-the-
protection-gap-for-refugees-/168094eb87; see also leaked reports from Operation Sophia reported in Zach Campbell, Europe’s
Deadly Migration Strategy: Officials Knew EU Military Operation Made Mediterranean Crossing More Dangerous, POLITICO
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-deadly-migration-strategy-leaked-documents/.
98SeeMinos Mouzourakis, “We Need to Talk about Dublin” Responsibility under the Dublin System as a Blockage to Asylum
Burden-Sharing in the European Union (Oxford Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper Series No 105, Dec. 2015), https://
www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp105-we-need-to-talk-about-dublin.pdf.
99See for example the recent agreement between the US and Guatemala, supra note 22.
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maintain the impassability of the Mediterranean sea, the EU and its member states have not only
empowered the Libyan Coast Guard, but have also used private actors, such as, for example, mer-
chant vessels, in the practice of push-backs.100 Moreover, alongside states, migration or border
management is also performed by EU specialized agencies, and specifically Frontex,101 the status
and reviewability of which under EU administrative law is complex.102 Moreover, both at the EU
external borders103 and along migration routes,104 local groups of vigilantes are allowed to operate.
This latter phenomenon has also been documented in the southern border of the United States.105
While this panoply of actors reflects the complexity and extent of the mobilization of anti-
migration forces, it also reflects the increasing outsourcing of anti-migrant policies by the states
of the Global North. To the extent that law, alongside political action, is an important avenue in
identifying and addressing both direct and indirect state violence against migrants, international
law offers a number of tools and regimes. Currently, the primary legal efforts within international
law are based on questions of state responsibility and complicity,106 applying general public
international law, human rights law, and refugee law.107 For these efforts, the main questions
are whether the particular techniques of distancing, such as the arrangement between Italy
and Libya or the use of private actors, can be addressed through the rules on state responsibility
or the interpretation of Article 1 of the ECHR, establishing the applicability of the Convention.108
100See Forensic Architecture & GLAN, Privatised Pushback of the Nivin (Dec. 18, 2019), https://forensic-architecture.org/
investigation/nivin. GLAN submitted a complaint against Italy before the UNHuman Rights Committee. See Communication
to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in the case of SDG against Italy (anonymized version) (Dec. 18,
2019), https://c5e65ece-003b-4d73-aa76-854664da4e33.filesusr.com/ugd/14ee1a_e0466b7845f941098730900ede1b51cb.pdf.
For background, see https://www.glanlaw.org/nivincase.
101See Daniel Howden, Apostolis Fotiadis & Anthony Lowenstein, Once Migrants on Mediterranean Were Saved by Naval
Patrols. Now They Have to Watch as Drones Fly Over, THE OBSERVER (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2019/aug/04/drones-replace-patrol-ships-mediterranean-fears-more-migrant-deaths-eu.
102See generallyMELANIE FINK, FRONTEX AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RESPONSIBILITY IN “MULTI-ACTOR SITUATIONS” UNDER THE
ECHR AND EU PUBLIC LIABILITY LAW ch. 4 (2019); see also Melanie Fink, The Action for Damages as a Fundamental Rights
Remedy: Holding Frontex Liable, in this issue.
103See Giorgos Christides, Steffen Lüdke & Maximilian Popp, Videos Show Apparent Illegal Pushback of Migrants,
DER SPIEGEL (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.spiegel.de/international/globalsocieties/greece-videos-show-apparent-illegal-
pushback-of-migrants-a-1301228.html.
104On illegal push-backs and far-right vigilante groups operating in Central Europe and the Balkans see Border Violence
Monitoring Network, Illegal Push-backs and Border Violence Reports, Balkan Region (Sep. 2019), https://www.borderviolence.
eu/wp-content/uploads/September-2019-Report-1.pdf; Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge Violence and Abuse
against Refugees and Migrants along the Balkans Route (Mar. 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/
EUR0599642019ENGLISH.PDF.
105See Simon Romero, Militia in New Mexico Detains Asylum Seekers at Gunpoint, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/us/new-mexico-militia.html. In this instance the leader of that militia is being pros-
ecuted. See Aimee Ortiz, Leader of Right-Wing Border Militia Pleads Guilty to Federal Gun Charge, NEW YORK TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/us/militia-border-migrants-guilty.html.
106See U.N. Int’l L. Comm. (ILC), Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UNGA A/56/10 and
A/56/49(Vol.I)/Corr.4 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA]. “Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act:
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally
responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.” Id. art. 16.
107These are, of course, discussed elsewhere in this Special Issue; see, in particular, Itamar Mann, The Right to Perform
Rescue at Sea: Jurisprudence and Drowning, in this issue; Violeta Moreno-Lax, The Architecture of Functional Jurisdiction:
Unpacking Contactless Control—On Public Powers, S.S. and Others v. Italy, and the “Operational Model”, in this issue.
108This is the focus point of the case S.S. and Others v. Italy, App. No. 21660/18, submitted by GLAN and the Association
for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI), on behalf of Seventeen survivors of a fatal incident in which a boat carrying
migrants found itself in distress off the coast of Libya, with support from the Italian non-profit ARCI and Yale Law
School’s Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic. The submission made use of evidence compiled by Forensic
Oceanography, part of the Forensic Architecture agency based at Goldsmiths, University of London. See Moreno-Lax, supra
note 107.
German Law Journal 587
While these legal regimes, and these interpretive techniques, offer significant tools to counter
the avoidance of responsibility, they not only remain state-centric; there are also instances where
reviewability is denied109 or where the rules of complicity or jurisdiction cannot travel back over
the distance created. Indeed, a central element of distancing techniques is precisely to avoid legal
responsibility, calibrating for example the level of support provided to external actors. From the
point of view of navigating the existing structures and techniques of responsibility avoidance, is
there an added value in turning to ICL? Assuming that some of the behavior is plausibly labeled an
international crime, would there be an added value in employing ICL in order to individualize
responsibility? Could ICL provide nimbler, more far-reaching, and more precise tools for iden-
tifying, expressing, and labelling the appropriate levels of responsibility in complex structures of
policy and power?
II. International Criminal Law’s Promise in the Tracing of Responsibility
One of the goals of the distance created and maintained by the practices of migration control is the
depersonalization of the violence. Not only in the denial of the individual humanity of the
migrants affected, but also in the obfuscation of the personal role and responsibilities of individual
decisionmakers and actors. Through multiple layers of physical and administrative distance, key
decision makers are disassociated from the potential consequences of their actions. This, alongside
the perception of the violence against migrants as a normal consequence of their risky endeavors,
or indeed their association with crime through direct or indirect criminalization, makes it difficult
to think of key decision makers as criminally liable.
ICL’s foundational ethos, whether expressed in the canonical prosecutorial call that international
crimes are committed by “men, not abstract entities”110 or in influential philosophical insights in the
“banality of evil,”111 promises to counter that distance and to humanize responsibility. Central in this
task is the extraction of the individual’s role and blame from collective action. From political and
military leaders to foot soldiers, the image of the perpetrator of international crimes has been playing
an evolving role in locating and humanizing the blame for complex and spectacular violence and
suffering.112 At the same time, and despite the stated ambition to resolutely individualize blame,
both the doctrine and the practice of ICL manifestly maintain the centrality of collective structures
and therefore subject collectivities, including states, to the expressive effects of labelling.113 This can
be seen in the definition of all core crimes: most clearly the crime of aggression, requiring a prior act
of state;114 but also genocide, where, with the exception of the lone génocidaire cas d’école, a
109See European Council Press Release 144/16, EU-Turkey Statement (Mar. 18, 2016), available at https://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/. And see Cases T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-257/16 NF,
NG and NM v. European Council (Feb. 28, 2017), declaring that the General Court lacks jurisdiction to review the “alleged
agreement” and that, as per para. 72, “even supposing that an international agreement could have been informally concluded
during the meeting of 18 March 2016, something which has been denied by the European Council, the Council of the
European Union and the European Commission in the present cases, that agreement would have been an agreement con-
cluded by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the EU and the Turkish Prime Minister.”
110Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement Before the International Military Tribunal, (Nov. 21, 2945), https://www.
roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/opening-statement-before-the-international-military-tribunal/. See Gerry Simpson,
Men and Abstract Entities: Individual Responsibility and Collective Guilt in International Criminal Law, in SYSTEM
CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (André Nollkaemper & Harmen van der Wilt eds., 2009).
111HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (1963); David Luban, Hannah Arendt as a Theorist of International
Criminal Law, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 621 (2011); Kalpouzos & Mann, supra note 5.
112See Sofia Stolk, A Sophisticated Beast? On the Construction of an “Ideal” Perpetrator in the Opening Statements of
International Criminal Trials, 29(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 677 (2018).
113Frédéric Mégret, What Sort of Global Justice Is International Criminal Justice, 13(1) J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 77 (2015).
114See Rome Statute art. 8bis.
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genocidal or systematically violent policy is crucial;115 crimes against humanity, where, the potential
of widespread effects of isolated individual action to one side, the requirements of systematicity and
a policy require collective structures;116 and even war crimes, at least through the inter-collective
nature of the necessary contextual element of the existence of an armed conflict.117 The involvement
of the collective also plays a significant role in the rules governing the operation of ICL. For example,
the criterion of gravity, which determines the admissibility and prioritization of situations and
crimes before the ICC, has been interpreted by the Prosecutor to include the systematicity of
the crimes and the involvement of upper level authorities and state structures.118 Inevitably, pros-
ecutorial selection is perceived as the association of the collectivity which the individual perpetrators
represented in their impugned actions with the crimes themselves.119
The combination of ambitious individualization of blame with the recognition of the collective
action through which, and maybe for which, the individual acted, is also very much reflected in the
construction of modes of liability. That combination may be important in addressing violence
against migrants. Doctrinal techniques, if convincingly constructed and employed, may be both
consequential and revelatory in presenting to key institutions and to the public a case for blame-
worthiness of individuals far removed from the consequences of anti-migrant violence. At the
same time, the collective labeling triggered by the employment of ICL categories and institutions
could powerfully suggest the collective and shared responsibility of those of us who are citizens of
the states wielding that violence.
More specifically, the ICL doctrines of modes of liability could potentially describe and address
both vertical and horizontal structures. Vertical structures of authority are, for example, explored
through concepts of command and superior responsibility in both military and civilian settings.120
These doctrines could potentially be applied to state or corporate structures of migrant detention.
In this sense, the relations between Australian officials and officials in Nauru andManus Island, or
between corporate officers and employees in these very facilities, to the extent that they display the
necessary levels of effective control, knowledge and intention, can be used to identify far removed
perpetrators.121 In both cases, but especially in relation to the involvement of for-profit private and
corporate actors, the application of the doctrine may allow the revelation that it is the very effi-
ciency of the “business model” of migration management that constitutes the criminal liability of
those in control.
115The debates around the specific role of an overall genocidal policy and its influence on the finding of individual liability
include questions of evidentiary inference and questions of the definition of genocidal intent. See, e.g., Hans Vest, A Structure-
Based Concept of Genocidal Intent, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 781 (2007).
116On the requirement for a policy see, for example, Claus Kreß, On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The
Concept of Organization within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision, 23 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 855 (2010). See also the debate supra note 81 on the Katanga case.
117Moreover, the development of case law has increasingly linked the finding of the necessary organization for a non-state
armed group to qualify as a party to an armed conflict with the analysis of the same organization for the purposes of establish-
ing individual liability. See Procureur v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, jugement rendu en application
de l’article 74 du Statut (Dec. 18, 2012), par. 339 et seq.
118International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (Sep. 15, 2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf.
119See Marko Milanovic, Establishing the Facts about Mass Atrocities: Accounting for the Failure of the ICTY to Persuade
Target Audiences, 47(4) GEO. J. INT’L L. 1321–1378 (2016).
120Art. 28 of the Rome Statute provides, with respect to civilian superiors that “a superior shall be criminally responsible for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where: (a) The superior either knew, or con-
sciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such
crimes; (b) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and (c) The
superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or
to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”
121See ICC Australia Communication, 101–06.
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Similarly, combinations of vertical and parallel structures of action are addressed through the
modes such as co-perpetration,122 and different levels of accessorial liability, including aiding and
abetting, instigation, or any other contributions made with the necessary knowledge and the intent
to further “the criminal activity or the criminal purpose of the group.”123 While degrees of inten-
tionality and knowledge vary, and specific instruments or jurisprudential lines of argument have
been more restrictive,124 the modes’ capacity to capture different types of collective behavior is
quite expansive.125 The expressive value of articulating horizontal or combinations of vertical
and horizontal structures may be to foreground the role of intentionality and knowledge in
the formation of migration management and accountability avoidance strategies. Finally, in order
to use the modes of liability as tools to address the actors’ distance in violence against migrants, it
will be important to consider that the conduct required for a particular type of liability may be a
combination of actions and omissions.
For example, a public-private partnership like the one struck between the Australian govern-
ment and private corporations including G4S, Wilson Security and Ferrovial could be explored
through the mode of co-perpetration: Did both public and private parties make “essential con-
tributions” in the execution of a common plan?126 Were these contributions aimed at the reali-
zation of those parts of the migration management strategy that can be understood as constituting
international crimes? In the European context, can the relations between Frontex and specific
states establish a relation of co-perpetration or accessorial liability of Frontex agents in the man-
agement of unlawful detention127 or unlawful deportations?128 Importantly, would the financial
aid and material support129 provided by the European Union and its member states to actors,
including the Libyan Coast Guard, involved in the process of pull-backs, detention, and inhumane
treatment of asylum seekers satisfy the requirements of accessorial liability in the Rome Statute
and/or customary ICL?130
Not all of these questions need to be answered in the affirmative and an ICL analysis that
assumes they should would fail to genuinely enquire how the modes in the doctrine map onto
the world and would very quickly spend the expressivist capital of the doctrine. Instead, our
122Art. 25 of the Rome Statute provides that “3 : : : . a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible.”
123Art. 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute provides for liability for a person who “(d) In any other way contributes to the com-
mission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution
shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made
in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.”
124On the debate over a “specific direction” criterion in the jurisprudence of the ICTY, see Prosecutor v. Perišic´, Case No.
IT-04–81-A, Judgment, para. 36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Perišic´ Appeal
Judgment]. For a critique, see Antonio Coco & Tom Gal, Losing Direction: The ICTY Appeals Chamber’s Controversial
Approach to Aiding and Abetting in Perišic´, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 345 (2014). While that controversy has been settled towards
a broader standard, the words “for the purposes of” in art. 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute suggest that lawful types of assistance
may be excluded. For the application of the standard in ICC jurisprudence, see Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-
01/04–01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 279 (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?
uri=1286409.
125See, e.g., Allison M. Danner & Jennifer S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal Law, 9 CAL. L. REV. 150 (2005).
126See on “the division of essential tasks for the purpose of committing a crime,” Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/
04–01/06, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 342 (Feb. 7, 2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?
uri=266175.
127Kalpouzos & Mann, supra note 5, at 21–24.
128See Christides, Lüdke & Popp, supra note 103.
129On the extent and function of the European Union funding for Libyan migration control see report by Oxfam, The EU
Trust Fund for Africa: Trapped between Aid Policy and Migration Politics (Jan. 30, 2020), https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/
publications/the-eu-trust-fund-for-africa-trapped-between-aid-policy-and-migration-politics-620936.
130This, alongside other forms of liability, has been argued in Shatz & Branco, supra note 56, paras. 972–1000.
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analysis of different actors’ roles in the types of violence against migrants that constitute
international crimes should aim to identify their material contributions and mental states. For
example, one would have to determine whether an individual occupying a position in the corpo-
rate structure of company, through their executive decisions, provided an “essential contribution”
to the act of unlawful imprisonment, while possessing, thanks to the existing corporate reporting
structure, the requisite knowledge.131
As in the employment of the category of crimes against humanity to describe the exercise of
democratic states’ sovereign prerogatives, it can be revelatory to consider presumptively legiti-
mate—or at least not criminal—structures of behavior from the point of view of ICL. It suggests
that it is not inconceivable that actors who appear geographically, physically, but also rhetorically
and aesthetically removed from the violence perpetrated against migrants could and should be
associated with, and blamed for, that very violence.
As mentioned, ICL has long grappled with the question of remote actors with no physical blood
on their hands, acting in unexceptional, conformist, “banal” ways. The case of Adolf Eichmann
has served as a paradigm of this type of actor.132 This paradigm is both revelatory and obfuscatory.
It is revelatory in reminding us of the moral and potentially legal liability of non-immediately
violent actors, hidden behind a complex bureaucratic structure. Yet, that function of the para-
digm—or, indeed, the parable is buttressed, supported, but potentially defanged through the
all-encompassing spectacle of the evil of the Third Reich. It is therefore more difficult, even when
the use of the doctrinal tools allows it, to imagine, trace, and appreciate individual responsibility in
complex structures when the labeling of the very violence itself is a matter of debate.133 When even
the border guards or coast guard actors don’t seem to be perpetrating acts that qualify as
international crimes, the distance of bureaucratic actors “responding” to a complex situation,
an “emergency,” allows for their placement outside the conceivable gallery of perpetrators. In this
way, the application of the ICL concepts of crimes and individual responsibility invites us to chal-
lenge our understanding of the nature of violence against migrants itself, as well as the expanding
system of responsibility avoidance that supports it.
D. Engaging Global Institutions
The expressive power of ICL is rooted in its definitions of criminality and its formulations of
responsibility, but is pursued through its institutions. From the mobilization of prosecutorial
prerogative through the performance of the trial134 to the imposition of punishment,135 both
national and international courts claim the authority to apply the heavy concepts of ICL.
Indeed, the evocation of these concepts empowers national courts to act, even when a close con-
nection to the crime doesn’t exist and to the extent that the state has instituted some form of
universal jurisdiction.136 However, beyond the power of their characterization as international
crimes, the transnational nature and potential global impact of crimes against migrants have
131It should be noted that both academic and advocacy applications of ICL in such instances usually, if not always, stop
short of identifying, and making the case against, particular individuals. Instead, they request the relevant prosecutorial and
investigative body to do so. This was the case with the ICC Australia Communication.
132For the point that Eichmann constitutes a “thought-experiment” irrespective from whether Arendt’s description of the
historical Eichmann is accurate, see Itamar Mann, Eichmann’s Mistake – The Problem of Thoughtlessness in International
Criminal Law, 33 CA. J. L. JURIS. 145 (2020).
133See also id.
134See GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR, AND CRIME ch. 5 (2007).
135Indeed, the expressivist, or communicative, theory of domestic criminal law has centered on the practice of punishment.
See, e.g., ANTONY R. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY (2001). This is only partially true in relation to
the debate on the expressive function of international criminal law.
136On the selective application of universal jurisdiction see Frédéric Mégret, The “Elephant in the Room” in Debates
about Universal Jurisdiction: Diasporas, Duties of Hospitality, and the Constitution of the Political, 6(1) TRANSNAT’L LEG.
THEORY 89 (2015).
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particular consequences for the engagement of both national and international judicial institu-
tions. The first concerns the transnational nature of the phenomenon of migration and how this
is reflected in the finding of a court’s jurisdiction. The second concerns the perceived importance
of violence against migrants, and how this can be approached through the category of gravity, as a
criterion for admissibility at the ICC. This section will discuss these in turn, before concluding
with some thoughts on the engagement of international judicial institutions, and specifically
the ICC.
I. The Transnational Nature of Crimes Against Migrants and the Activation of Jurisdiction
In September 2018 and in November 2019 a Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) of the ICC authorized the
Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation of alleged crimes committed in the situation in
Myanmar against Rohingya civilians, targeted and forced to flee by the state and associated
militias.137 The decisions are of importance for a number of reasons, not least in that they open
the way for the Court to address a situation of widespread violence against individuals portrayed
by the state as foreign bodies in need of expulsion. Indeed, while the Rohingya have inhabited the
Rakhine province for generations, the rhetoric for their dehumanization is familiar: The Rohingya
are characterized as “illegal immigrants” and as “criminals,” with aggravating qualifications of a
sexual (“rapists”) and religio-political nature (“terrorists”).138 What is more, the violence against
the Rohingya has paired exterminatory practices with the widespread phenomenon of forced dis-
placement. At the heart of this is the act of forced, and unlawful, deportation. Indeed, the other
main crime against humanity alleged and discussed in the decisions, persecution, is discussed as
leading to deportation.139 We discussed these above; here it is important to focus on the context of
jurisdiction. Indeed, part of the innovative importance of the ICC PTC’s decisions is that they
establish jurisdiction based on the transnational nature of the crimes.
The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed by nationals or on the territory of a state that
has signed and ratified the Rome Statute.140 Myanmar has not, but its neighbor Bangladesh has.141
The Prosecutor submitted, and the PTC accepted, that to the extent that the crime of deportation
entails the essential element of crossing a border,142 jurisdiction can be established even if just one,
and not necessarily the initial, element of the crime occurs in the territory of a member state. The
forceful and unlawful deportation of individuals from the territory of a non-member state to the
territory of a member state falls within the jurisdiction of the Court. The second PTC decision
went further. By equating a crime’s “conduct”143 with “actus reus” and by including the conse-
quences of the crime within this concept, it accepts the potential transnational extension of
137Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute, Case No. ICC-
RoC46(3)-01/18, Pre-Trial Chamber III (Sept. 6, 2018); Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of
Myanmar, Case No. ICC-01/19-27, Pre-Trial Chamber III (Nov. 14, 2019). As the present article is going in print, the same
situation, subject to different rules of jurisdiction, is before the International Court of Justice as a contentious case between the
Gambia and Myanmar. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The
Gambia v. Myanmar), with documents available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/178.
138SeeHuman Rights Council, Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-FindingMission onMyanmar, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/42/CRP.5 (Sept. 16, 2019). See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), Public sitting held on Tuesday Dec. 10, 2019, at 10 a.m., Verbatim Record, at
29–30 (for the terms used in genocidal language), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191210-ORA-01-00-BI.
pdf.
139ICC PTC, Decision on Authorisation, supra note 137, para. 109.
140See Rome Statute art. 12.
141Bangladesh deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute on Mar. 23, 2010. See https://asp.icc-cpi.int/
en_menus/asp/states%20parties/asian%20states/Pages/bangladesh.aspx.
142This should be distinguished from internal forcible transfer.
143Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute refers to “The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred.”
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jurisdiction even when the part of the conduct that occurs in the territory of a member state is not,
as was the case with the crime of deportation, a legal element of the crime.144 This approach has
been subject to critique, on grounds of clarity and treaty interpretation,145 presumption of state
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by an international court, or the pragmatic consequences in
relation to the ability of the Court to investigate acts of non-cooperative states.146 But the examples
reflect an instance where the transnational human movement empowers an international insti-
tution to assert jurisdiction.147
II. Why Should the ICC Prioritize the Investigation of Crimes Against Migrants?
If the transnational nature of the phenomenon facilitates the activation of multiple jurisdictions,
then the widespread effects of violence against migrants may also be an important factor in the exer-
cise and prioritization of such jurisdiction. The legal regime of the ICC provides certain criteria of
admissibility, most importantly the concepts of complementarity and gravity, which determine
whether it can exercise its jurisdiction. The criterion of gravity, discussed here, will also be an impor-
tant factor in the decision of the Prosecutor to prioritize the investigation of certain situations and
cases.148 As with the concepts and definitions of substantive crimes andmodes of liability, the nature
of the violence against migrants and the techniques of distancing invite us to re-think the rules on
the exercise and prioritization of jurisdiction and, through this, the developing role of the ICC.
Left entirely undefined in the Rome Statute, and only gradually developed through the practice
and statements of the OTP and the Court’s Chambers, gravity is where the labeling power of ICL is
put into effect and enhanced through the mobilization of the regime’s central institution. While
considerations of gravity lato sensu play a role in the qualification of an act as an international
crime,149 the additional application of gravity as a criterion of admissibility aims to legitimate the
Court’s (and Prosecutor’s) action. The evolution and application of the criteria of gravity, accord-
ingly, tell the story of what types of behavior, and what (collective) actors in different parts of the
world, the Prosecutor and Court chooses to target.
Initially focused on rather crude quantitative criteria,150 a taxonomy of qualitative considera-
tions has been gradually considered. The Court has increasingly recognized the abhorrence of
particular types of violence, such as torture or sexual violence, the vulnerability of certain victims,
such as children, and the systematic nature of their perpetration, including the involvement of
high-level authorities. Beyond the capacity of certain types of violence and perpetration to “shock
the conscience,”151 an increasingly dynamic understanding of the qualitative nature of gravity has
144See Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the
People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Case No. ICC-01/19-27, Pre-Trial Chamber III, paras.
46–62 (Nov. 14, 2019).
145Dov Jacobs, ICC PTC Authorises Investigation in Bangladesh/Myanmar: Some Thoughts, SPREADING THE JAM (Nov. 15,
2019), https://dovjacobs.com/2019/11/15/icc-ptc-authorises-investigation-in-bangladesh-myanmar-some-thoughts/.
146Douglas Guilfoyle, The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction over the Situation in Myanmar, 73 AUSTRALIAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2 (2019).
147Indeed, the same could apply to a domestic court’s interpretation and application of the crime of deportation, to the
extent that the unlawful deportation was to the territory of the state.
148See Rome Statute arts. 17 and 53.
149See, e.g., Rome Statute art. 7(1)(g) on sexual violence. See also the reference to a “similar character” of “other inhumane
acts” for them to constitute crimes against humanity in art. 7(1)(k). Similarly, a notion of gravity plays a role for “serious”
violations of international humanitarian law, constituting war crimes in customary law and the Rome Statute, e.g., in art.
8(2)(b).
150See ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Communication Concerning the Situation in Iraq, at 8 (Feb. 9, 2006). See Kevin Jon
Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 230
(Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., 2010).
151See the Preamble to the Rome Statute: “Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been
victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity : : : .”
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been included in the OTP’s considerations, through the term “impact.” The OTP has accordingly
summarized the criteria as “relating to the scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact of the
crimes.”152
Some situations of systematic anti-migrant violence, such as the one developed by Australia,
would comfortably meet the traditional criteria of gravity. This is both because of the number of
victims and the vulnerability of the victims, including both refugees in general and especially chil-
dren. But it is also because of the abhorrence of certain types of violence, the systematic nature of
the commission of the crimes, and the involvement of high-level authorities. These elements cor-
respond to the quantitative and qualitative criteria of gravity established in the jurisprudence.153
At the same time, the nature of migration and the violent response to it invites us to stress the
criterion of impact. “Impact” is said to be considered “in light of, inter alia, the increased vulner-
ability of victims, the terror subsequently instilled, or the social, economic and environmental
damage inflicted on the affected communities.”154 It is worth thinking about whether and how
the impact of the violence of anti-migration policies is spread in a way that demands its priori-
tization. The often-stated goal of anti-migration is the deterrence (through effectively punitive
action) of further migration, and the elimination of the so-called “pull” factors. In addition,
techniques for the avoidance of responsibility are spreading across the global north.155 This points
to the far-reaching impact of these potential crimes on both victims, potential victims, perpetra-
tors, and future perpetrators. The acts of states and those they employ are crafted precisely to
expand and amplify—often very far—the message that migrants are not welcome and that they
can expect to suffer, should they risk the journey “north.” Thinking about “impact” in this way
may point us to the heart of the matter: That the violence qualified as criminal is not an incidental
and regrettable, if inevitable, aspect of an otherwise legitimate sovereign policy. Instead, it is both
the means and ends of the policy of deterrence, with intended results affecting not only those
making the journey, but communities far beyond. Therefore, both the far-reaching impact and
the claims of legitimacy and sovereign protection fueling violence against migrants, filtered
and enhanced through techniques of responsibility avoidance, increase the gravity of the situation.
As is the case with the characterization of the violence against migrants as an international
crime and with our understanding of the relevant actors as bearing individual criminal liability,
understanding the gravity of the crimes challenges our imagination. The act of migration, in the
context of ICL, invites us to flip the assumptions under which the legal regime operates—our
assumptions about what a crime looks like, what a criminal looks like, and what the job of
our institutions is. Benevolence, legitimacy, the prerogatives of sovereignty, all work to maintain
an asymmetrical relationship, in terms of the conventional application of the categories of crimi-
nal law, in terms of where and how the law’s labels are to be applied. The formal categories of the
lex lata are available to apply, or develop, and potentially walk back the distance in the present
relationship between migration and crime.
152Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, supra note 118, at para. 32.
153ICC Australia Communication, at 110–13.
154Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, supra note 118, at para. 41. See also Heller, supra note 150. Much has
been made of the OTP’s reference to environmental destruction and economic crimes, such as land-grabs, as indicating a more
structural and dynamic understanding of the nature of crimes and their impacts. It remains to be seen what effect this will have
on Persecutorial policy on case selection and prioritization.
155The Australian model has specifically inspired aspirations for emulation. See Austrian Minister wants to replicate
Australian model for refugees, EURACTIV.COM (June 6, 2016), https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/
austrian-minister-wants-to-replicate-australian-modelfor-migrants/; Rachel Eddie, “Australia Has an Interesting Model”:
Danish MPs to Visit Nauru Detention Centre in the Hope it May Provide Answers to Migration Crisis in Europe, DAILY
MAIL (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3756451/Danish-MPs-visit-Australia-s-detention-centre-
Nauru.html. Beyond an exact replication of this model, what is emulated is the combination of detention, deportation
and avoidance of responsibility described above.
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In institutional terms, this augurs for the responsibility of an international institution like the
ICC to realize a more sophisticated and politically consequential understanding of the principles
of complementarity and gravity enshrined in its Statute. In that process, the Court may be able to
move away from its almost exclusive focus on violence perpetrated in the global south and the
spaces wherefrom migration is seen to originate. For legal advocates, and those who seek to chal-
lenge both powerful actors and established understandings of international law, it may also point
to some value in taking international criminal law generally, and the International Criminal Court
specifically, as a serious site for engagement.
E. Against the Fetishization of International Criminal Law
The account laid out thus far has aimed to identify the potential in analyzing, characterizing and
adjudicating violence against migrant—which forms part of developed states’ anti-migration
policies, supported by developing techniques of responsibility avoidance—through the categories
and tools of ICL. The argument for such a potential is in danger of painting an uncritical picture of
international criminal law and institutions as the most powerful and best set of tools to label and
address the violence against migrants. In this concluding section, I wish to explore and express
some counterarguments and doubts. There are two predictable mainstream critiques of the argu-
ments presented above. The first concerns the risks to doctrinal clarity and the uniqueness of
international criminal law. The second focuses on the practical unlikelihood of success of the
modes of argumentation and advocacy I have presented thus far. Here, however, I want to focus
on the deeper critiques that remain even if one is not compelled by these more predictable
mainstream concerns. Engaging such deeper critiques is especially important when one sets
out, as I have tried to do here, a “critical” approach—in its effort to make visible the power
structures of Western and intergovernmental bureaucracies of management, in its manner of
potentially shedding light on the political and emancipatory act of migrating.
The combination of the power of labelling, and the expansive and inherently global reach of the
tools of ICL create the temptation to see it as a silver bullet. One that will reveal and recognize an
increasing range of crimes, and hold accountable the most blameworthy perpetrators, especially
those from wealthy and powerful states. It is a promise of vindication. The punitive imagination is
a powerful thing. It allows us to project our deeply felt moral certainty, and may lull us into com-
placency in doing so. The recognition and exposition of the moral and political biases in the
existing practices of international criminal law and punishment doesn’t, by itself, justify support-
ing an alternative practice, even one that purports to reverse the existing bias. The danger is that
both in terms of labeling and in terms of the tracing of individual and collective responsibility, an
ICL practice that sees itself as critical is anything but. At the heart of this danger is daring to
conceive of ICL as anything but a hegemonic governance practice of powerful actors who seek
to defeat their weaker enemies in law as well as in fact.
There is a well-developed critique of criminal law as a conceptual and institutional apparatus
which primarily serves the exercise of power. The recognition of who and what is criminal and
their punishment uses the creation of a feeling of punitive solidarity in society to bolster those in
the dominant position to control the institutions of power.156 Different facets of this critique have
been applied to the existing history and institutions of ICL, ranging from the association of ICL
with imperialism and capitalism157 to realist assessments of the ICC’s scope of action.158 The
argument is that ICL is necessarily and inescapably hegemonic. Moreover, for all its promises
156See Carvalho & Chamberlen, supra note 40.
157See Grietje Baars, Making ICL History: On the Need to Move beyond Prefab Critiques, in CRITICAL APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (Christine Schwöbel ed., 2014); Tor Krever, International Criminal
Law: An Ideology Critique, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 701 (2013).
158DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD OF POWER POLITICS (2013).
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to identify and link responsibility with acts, critiques of the operation of ICL and the ICC have
shown that the existing regime does not reduce distance, but rather increases and imposes it.159
Can there be an ICL conceived and practiced in an anti-hegemonic manner, not reinforcing but
challenging the structures of global power? Would such a practice be anything more than a
momentary and low-cost protest rhetoric? Would such an application in any way survive its ambi-
tion? And could this be done in the context of the violence against migrants? This Article has
attempted to relate such a vision of ICL to the migration and the violence against migrants,
but has done so only at a conceptual level. Recently, the Prosecutor of the ICC, in her periodic
reports on the evolution of her investigations into the situation in Libya, declared that alongside
preexisting cases against the Qaddafi regime and potential cases against armed rebels, she is look-
ing into violence perpetrated against migrants throughout the territory of Libya, and in particular
in the context of detention facilities that operate therein. This has followed reports by UN Special
Rapporteurs, stressing that acts of murder160 or torture161 against migrants may constitute
international crimes and that, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such crimes under
the jurisdiction of the ICC have occurred, the Court should investigate. In terms of the potential
perpetrators, the Prosecutor has pointed out that violations and potential crimes are committed by
a complex network of actors.162 And yet, despite the well documented cooperation between
European states and the Libyan Coast Guard,163 the Prosecutor’s account of this network does
not include such states. It may be that, despite evidence of close cooperation, the Prosecutor’s
view is that a legal argument of complicity is implausible and not even worthy of examination.
It may also be that the stance reflects the recurring limitations of current ICL institutions. The
exclusion of even the potential investigation of European actors, in any case, reinforces the power-
ful actors’ success in the avoidance of responsibility.
But the limitations of the actually-existing ICC aside, the question remains whether marshal-
ling international criminal law can ever be anything more than an exercise in punitive imagination
or, worse, further strengthen a set of tools that do more harm than good, both in what they focus
on and in what they leave out.164 Does talking about international criminal law and allowing it to
capture our imagination crowd out other forms and types of legal imagination and practice, as well
as political action?165 The question is rendered more poignant in the context of migration. If we
recognize that the gravity of the violence against migrants is such because it reflects and is the
consequence of a fundamental asymmetry of political power, punitively applied, is the attempt
to flip that relationship sterile mimesis? Is throwing back the label of crimmigration to its
159PHIL CLARK, DISTANT JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ON AFRICAN POLITICS (2018);
Mark Drumbl,Distant Justice Symposium: Some Thoughts on Getting Close, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 3, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/
2019/10/03/distant-justice-symposium-some-thoughts-on-getting-close/.
160Agnes Callamard, Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc.
A/72/335 (Aug. 15, 2017).
161Nils Melzer, Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report
on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/59 (Jan. 16, 2019).
162Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSC Res. 1970 (2011) (May 8,
2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180508-otp-statement-libya-UNSC.
163See, among the sources cited infra, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Bridging the Protection Gap for
Refugees and Migrants in the Mediterranean (May 2019), https://rm.coe.int/lives-saved-rights-protected-bridging-the-
protection-gap-for-refugees-/168094eb87. And see Human Rights Watch, No Escape from Hell: EU Policies Contribute to
Abuse of Migrants in Libya (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no-escape-hell/eu-policies-contribute-
abuse-migrants-libya, especially section II.
164On the displacement theory as applied more broadly to human rights law see Paul O’Connell,Human Rights: Contesting
the Displacement Thesis, 69(1) NORTHERN IRELAND QUARTERLY 19–35 (2018). On ICL, see Krever supra note 157. On the
increasingly punitive turn of human rights, in the broad sense, see ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen
Engle, Zinaida Miller & D.M. Davis eds., 2016).
165Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Monopolizing Global Justice: International Criminal Law as Challenge to
Human Diversity, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 157 (2015).
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enforcers at best unimaginative and at worst a betrayal of the aspiration of liberty at the heart of
migration?
If one accepts the force of some of this critique of ICL, and its application to this subject matter,
one would be well advised to avoid fetishizing the regime and its institutions and to temper one’s
aspirations and expectations, not only in terms of their pragmatic feasibility, but also in terms of
their desirability. And yet, to the extent that we recognize that the categories of ICL, as legal
categories but also through their role in wider lay discourse, reflect an intuition of justice and
that these categories are meaningful to those fighting against anti-migration policies,166 the above
critiques can benefit our practice. Punitive tools and especially those with such expressivist power
should, if at all, be engaged with no illusions and with a conscious tactical and strategic under-
standing of the specific legal action.167 The conceptual stakes are accordingly increased, and this
influences crucial factors in strategic litigation,168 such as the likelihood of success, the potential
long-term consequences, the role of the action alongside different legal or political approaches, the
danger of causing regressive jurisprudence or empowering political backlash.
The nature of both the tools and the subject matter ought to inform the goals of the broader
engagement, beyond the political or legal success in a specific case. If punitive institutions and
rules are properly understood as wielding a form of violence themselves,169 their employment
can only have and be limited to insurgent or guerrilla qualities. This is especially the case as
the “war,” as it were, is not aiming at any particular final arrangement of punitive power.
Migration will be ongoing170 and whatever the developing configuration between sending and
receiving states and populations, the asymmetry of power will remain. So what is the ultimate
goal, beyond the rhetorical, political or even legal success of specific tactical engagements? It is
to express what needs to be protected internationally—the humanity in the migration of
people—and to reveal the qualities of the growing threat. And yet, in doing this, the use of
international criminal law can at best highlight the structures of asymmetry and injustice present
both in anti-migration policies and in international criminal law itself.
166See Boochani, supra note 3. See also Itamar Mann, Boochani’s Tribunal: Normalizing Human Degradation at Borders,
JUST SECURITY (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/67718/boochanis-tribunal-normalizing-human-degradation-at-
borders/; Itamar Mann, The New Impunity: Border Violence as Crime (draft on file with author).
167See Robert Knox, Strategy and Tactics, 21 FINNISH Y.B. I.L. 193 (2011).
168See Sander, supra note 39. See, more generally, HELEN DUFFY, STRATEGIC HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: UNDERSTANDING
AND MAXIMISING IMPACT (2018).
169For a classic exposition of that argument see Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 85(8) YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
170It may also intensify due to environmental factors and climate change. See JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
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